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ARGENTINA IN A CHANGING  
NUCLEAR ORDER:  AN APPRAISAL
F E D E R I C O  M E R K E
FOR MUCH OF ITS MODERN HISTORY,  Argentina has alternatively 
punched under and over its weight and has struggled to attain a balance between do-
mestic and international responsibilities, on the one hand, and between its Western and 
Latin American identities, on the other hand. Argentine foreign policy has typically 
been an instrument of domestic politics, in which rhetorical gestures on the interna-
tional scene have sometimes yielded short-term domestic gains. The Argentine National 
Congress has historically played a rather marginal role in foreign policy, and this has 
reinforced the autonomy of the presidency in designing and executing it. Moreover, an 
ever more fragmented and denationalized party system has only increased the parochial 
view of the Argentine political elite. As a result, foreign policy in Argentina has remained 
almost solely in the domain of the executive and has been fairly dependent on the ideas 
and preferences of the president and the president’s inner circle of trusted advisers. This 
may explain in part why Argentina’s foreign policy may be seen as somewhat erratic or 
inconsistent across administrations.
And yet, Argentina’s history with nuclear affairs has been much more stable than the 
overall trajectory of its foreign policy. Yes, there have been changes since the 1980s, when 
the country returned to democracy, but overall, Argentina has developed a bottom-up, 
consensus-based, incremental approach to the nuclear order. In this light, Argentina’s 
nuclear preferences have evolved from unilateral postures in the 1970s and 1980s toward 
bilateral and multilateral commitments from the 1990s onward. 
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Even before Argentina became the first Latin American country to use nuclear energy 
when its first commercial nuclear power reactor went online in 1974, it defended the 
right to nuclear development for peaceful purposes. During the 1960s, Argentina took 
a critical stand against the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and depicted it as 
the “disarmament of the disarmed,” in 
the words of José María Ruda, then the 
Argentine ambassador to the United Na-
tions.1 Between the 1960s and the 1980s, 
its nuclear program included unsafe-
guarded nuclear facilities for uranium 
enrichment and plutonium reprocessing, 
yet Argentina never made the political 
decision to develop nuclear weapons.
With the return of democracy in 1983, 
military programs were firmly placed un-
der civilian control. In the 1980s, a rapprochement with Brazil took place, and in 1991, 
a bilateral framework, the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of 
Nuclear Materials (ABACC), was established to further nuclear cooperation. That same 
year, Argentina signed the Quadripartite Agreement with the ABACC, Brazil, and the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on the application of nuclear safeguards. 
The ABACC framework transformed the nature of Brazil-Argentina relations. In 1993, 
Argentina joined two multilateral export control regimes—the Australia Group and the 
Missile Technology Control Regime. A year later, Argentina joined the Treaty for the 
Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlate-
lolco) and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), a multilateral export control regime, and 
acceded to the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon state in 1995. The next year, Argentina 
became a founding participating state of the Wassenaar Arrangement, a multilateral 
export control regime focusing on arms and dual-use technology. In sum, Argentina’s 
nuclear preferences have evolved to focus on lines of dialogue, confidence building, and 
incremental engagement with the global nuclear order. 
A number of reasons may explain Argentina’s nuclear preferences, but the main rationale 
so far has been that it sees the benefit of making the existing system work. In the 1990s, 
Argentina adhered to most of the multilateral nuclear arrangements to signal its overture 
to the West in general and to the United States in particular. As a result, Argentina aban-
doned its most controversial projects, including the Condor missile program. This, of 
course, alienated domestic actors (such as the armed forces and nuclear research agencies) 
with vested interests in the nuclear sector who voiced nationalist concerns. Ultimately, 
however, a neoliberal ideology trumped technology. 
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From 2003 onward—for a number of reasons, including the 2004 energy crisis—Ar-
gentina witnessed its own version of a nuclear renaissance and embarked on a number 
of ambitious programs to upgrade its nuclear profile. This renaissance has taken place 
mainly through domestic and international institutions and has been subject to bilateral 
and multilateral safeguards that Argentina accepts as legitimate standards for upholding 
the nuclear nonproliferation regime. Simply put, Argentina downloaded the software 
(that is, global regulations) in the 1990s, only to move forward with the hardware (that 
is, nuclear technology) ten years later. Indeed, Argentina is part of various multilateral ar-
rangements and coalitions of the willing—for example, the Proliferation Security Initia-
tive and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism—which would hardly seem 
to be attractive venues for domestic constituencies prone to anti-imperial maneuvers of 
sorts. Yet, Argentina has realized that it pays to engage with these multilateral instru-
ments as they serve the dual purposes of reducing uncertainty about Argentina’s nuclear 
preferences and ensuring swift access to resources in order to improve its nuclear stand-
ing. Said another way, technology has trumped ideology.
ENSURING THE RIGHT TO PEACEFUL  
NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY 
Argentina’s priority is to make the regime work to ensure that all recognized non-nuclear- 
weapon states maintain the right to develop peaceful nuclear programs. Argentina is 
committed to ensuring a level playing field wherein each NPT member has the right to 
develop nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. Argentina understands that nuclear 
technology has a role to play in national development and therefore aims to strengthen 
its position as a nuclear supplier of know-how, technology, and materials. Thus, Argenti-
na opposes the internationalization of the nuclear fuel cycle as it would deepen the tech-
nological divide that already exists among the haves and have-nots of the NPT regime.2
REDUCING THE SALIENCE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
Argentina supports a reduced role for nuclear weapons in national security strategies and 
is fully committed to the goal of nuclear disarmament. Argentina’s nuclear program is 
firmly oriented toward research and development; it has an entirely civilian outlook and 
is controlled by a strong, independent nuclear regulatory agency. The scale of its program 
is rather small, with only three operating nuclear reactors and a share in electricity pro-
duction of only about 10 percent.3 In 2010, Argentina reactivated its gaseous diffusion 
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uranium enrichment plant at Pilcaniyeu and started to develop an indigenous technology 
based on laser enrichment, which is in the proof-of-concept phase as of 2016.4 In 2015, 
then Argentine president Cristina Fernández de Kirchner announced that the country 
was enriching uranium, albeit in small quantities.5
Moreover, Argentina has exported nuclear reactors, radioactive substances (radioiso-
topes), and nuclear laboratories to a number of countries, including Algeria, Australia, 
Brazil, Egypt, and Peru. It is also an exporter of the molybdenum-99 radioisotope, 
widely used in nuclear medicine, and it is the third-largest supplier of the cobalt-60 
radioisotope, a radiation source for medical radiotherapy, industrial radiography, and 
medical equipment sterilization.6 Thus, the main focus of Argentina’s nuclear program is 
not nuclear deterrence or power ambitions but energy, research, and development. 
AVOIDING RAISING PROLIFERATION CONCERNS 
Even taking into account its limitations of scale and investment, Argentina aims to find 
its niche in the global nuclear marketplace. In this respect, the main challenge for Argen-
tina is to work toward a nonproliferation regime that allows the country to continue its 
nuclear program without causing proliferation, safety, or security concerns. This chal-
lenge has at least five dimensions. 
First, Argentina, along with Brazil, is still reluctant to sign the Additional Protocol, 
which provides the IAEA with greater authority to, among other things, verify the ab-
sence of undeclared nuclear activities and facilities. Argentina believes that the protocol 
imposes further nonproliferation burdens on non-nuclear-weapon states even as the P5 
states (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) continue to 
possess nuclear arsenals. For Argentina, therefore, the Additional Protocol establishes an 
even more unequal nuclear nonprolifera-
tion regime. Further, the requirement 
to adopt the protocol draws a thin line 
between nonproliferation and develop-
ment restrictions. The Nuclear Suppli-
ers Group provides a good example. In 
2011, 46 members of the NSG amended 
the group’s guidelines for exports of 
sensitive items to mandate members to 
require the Additional Protocol in recipi-
ent states. Argentina and Brazil opposed 
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this mandate and argued that their bilateral safeguards under the ABACC regime could 
be construed as being equal to the protocol. As a result, in June 2011, the NSG approved 
revised guidelines for the export of sensitive nuclear technologies and recognized the 
Quadripartite Agreement as an alternative to the Additional Protocol.7 
Second, safety has become a more salient issue in the Argentine nuclear sector, and there 
are signs that this will be a hot topic of discussion in years to come. Indeed, some serious 
safety problems in Belgium, Japan, and South Korea, among other countries, have led 
to concerns about the safety of nuclear power stations around the world. These concerns 
have been, and will continue to be, quite visible in Germany, Switzerland, and other 
countries with active environmentalist nongovernmental organizations and strong Green 
parties that influence public opinion on nuclear energy. European divisions over nuclear 
power have therefore deepened since the 2011 Fukushima disaster, and there is grow-
ing polarization about what can be done to continue to ensure safety in nuclear power 
plants. Argentina is worried about the extreme position presented by Germany and 
Switzerland (where the governments consider no level of radiation exposure to be safe). 
In other words, hypersafety will become a contested topic in Argentine diplomacy.8
Third, while Argentina’s concerns rest more on the economic end of the threat spectrum, 
proliferation continues to be a challenge that must be addressed. In this sense, Argen-
tina supports the recent P5+1 (plus Germany) nuclear agreement with Iran.9 Although 
it is far from perfect, it was achieved through diplomatic—and not military—means 
and Iran’s right to develop nuclear energy was preserved, something that is important to 
Argentina from a normative perspective.
Fourth, it is probable that security is the least problematic issue for Argentina. South 
America is mostly a zone of interstate peace. At the domestic level, there are no fierce 
ethnic, religious, or subnational challenges that may pose security threats. Moreover, 
transnational terrorism is mostly absent in the region. Yes, there have always been suspi-
cions regarding the presence of organized crime and terrorist groups such as Hezbollah in 
South America’s triple border, where Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay meet on the Paraná 
River, but these threats remain marginal. 
Fifth, the bilateral relationship with Brazil needs further dialogue and creative thought. 
The two countries have taken divergent paths in their respective nuclear diplomacies. 
Brazil appears to be more reticent to join the various nonproliferation-related groups 
such as the Wassenaar Arrangement or the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terror-
ism. In Brasília, there are more domestic voices critical of the NPT than in the mid-
2000s, and the probability of Brazil signing the Additional Protocol remains quite low. 
Argentina seems to have taken a more pragmatic approach. Mauricio Macri, who  
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assumed office as the Argentine president in December 2015, will have to decide wheth-
er the country is ready to take the next step and sign the Additional Protocol—with or 
without Brazil. 
MAINTAINING THE GLOBAL STATUS QUO 
Argentina’s priorities are more domestically than internationally focused. In 2009, the 
government issued the Nuclear Activity Law, which declared the country’s nuclear indus-
try a matter of national interest. In 2014, Argentina completed its third nuclear power 
reactor, Atucha II, which in June of that year reached its first criticality. The govern-
ment’s goal is for nuclear power to grow and reach a share of 15 to 18 percent in the 
country’s energy mix.10 In 2012, Argentina agreed with the China National Nuclear Cor-
poration to build a fourth nuclear plant, a pressurized heavy-water reactor that would 
be financed by China. This agreement includes the transfer of fuel fabrication and other 
technologies. In 2014, Argentina and China signed another agreement for a fifth nuclear 
plant, the ACP1000, based on a light-water design using enriched uranium. In April 
2015, Argentina and Russia signed a framework for cooperation on the construction of a 
sixth nuclear power plant with Russian financing. Lastly, Argentina has stepped into the 
business of building small modular reactors with the aim of providing a flexible, cost-
effective energy alternative in hard-to-reach locations. The indigenous design, CAREM 
(Argentine Power Station of Modular Elements), is a simplified pressurized-water reactor 
intended to provide an electrical output of 100 megawatts or less. The fuel is uranium 
oxide with uranium-235 enriched to 3.4 percent.11
For all these domestic priorities, main-
taining the global status quo is central to 
ensuring that Argentina meets its rather 
ambitious domestic targets. In this 
sense, a clear priority so far has been, 
and will continue to be, full engagement 
in the ongoing discussions taking place 
in the various nuclear clubs. To do this, 
the country has relied heavily on U.S. 
initiatives in furthering information-
sharing mechanisms and joint training 
exercises. Take the Proliferation Security Initiative, established in 2003, which seeks to 
improve multilateral interdiction efforts and, as of early 2016, is supported by more than 
100 countries. Argentina has not been a passive partner in this initiative but has played 
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an important role through its participation in the Operational Experts Group, which 
comprises 21 states working to ensure the initiative’s effectiveness. 
Moreover, in 2006, a group of countries established the Global Initiative to Combat 
Nuclear Terrorism, a partnership of more than 80 states committed to strengthening 
global and national capabilities to prevent, detect, and respond to nuclear terrorism. As 
of 2016, Argentina—which joined in 2010—along with Chile, Mexico, and Panama 
are the only Latin American countries to participate in this initiative. Argentina also 
became a full participant in the International Framework for Nuclear Energy Coop-
eration in 2011, one year after its establishment. Also that year, Argentina ratified the 
2005 Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. In 
November 2012, Argentina and the IAEA organized a regional workshop on the physi-
cal protection of nuclear material. The same year, Argentina held a regional workshop on 
protection against sabotage of nuclear facilities. Moreover, in the framework provided by 
the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, Argentina and Chile organized an 
exercise to respond to and mitigate terrorist acts. Argentina has also incorporated nuclear 
security in courses on nuclear and radiation safety in its training centers for nuclear tech-
nicians. On August 27, 2014, the Argentine National Congress approved the Interna-
tional Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism. And in June 2015, 
Argentina assumed the chair of the Nuclear Suppliers Group.
This nuclear diplomacy makes one thing clear: Argentina is willing to engage in the 
global discussion and to commit to the adoption of high standards related to safeguards, 
security, and safety. Yes, Argentinians have not put pressure on their leaders to sign the 
Additional Protocol, and the country is unhappy with ever more demanding nonprolif-
eration measures given the absence of serious discussion on nuclear disarmament among 
the P5. Yet on these issues, as with so much else, Argentina plays the constructive and 
responsible role of the loyal opposition.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Since the 1980s, Brazil has always been Argentina’s partner in determining how to face 
the two countries’ challenges in their relationship to the nuclear order. And yet, the ratio-
nale for continuing to view Brazil in this way is not as clear in 2016.
Argentina needs Brazil as much as Brazil needs Argentina, but the dialogue and coopera-
tion in 2016 is not what it was just a few years before. Between 2014 and 2015, ABACC 
survived solely on Argentine financial installments, as Brazil did not contribute its share 
until June 2015. It is true that this was not because of anti-ABACC sentiment in Brasília 
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but mainly due to an economic recession that resulted in severe budget cuts. Yet even so, 
the situation was not a good sign for and did not give a good impression of the effective-
ness of the bilateral safeguards regime. 
Argentina must deal with the shaky bilateral arrangement, and thus much of its nuclear 
diplomacy will surely depend on how it establishes a new equilibrium with Brazil. A 
renewed framework with Brazil should expand the cooperation basket by linking nuclear 
energy with other scientific and technological dimensions, such as space, research, and 
medicine. And without a doubt, signing the Additional Protocol without Brazil would be 
a mistake that would be difficult for Argentina to overcome.
At the global level, Argentina has seen that it is in its national interest to make the 
nuclear regime work on its behalf. If this observation is sound, then Argentina should 
continue working under the umbrella of the nuclear nonproliferation regime; it should 
continue working with the P5—all of the countries, not just the Western nuclear-
weapon states—as opposed to against or for them. The Argentine government should 
also continue its policy of ensuring that nuclear technology plays a role in the country’s 
national development. This means balancing Argentina’s national responsibilities geared 
toward development with its international responsibilities oriented toward increasing 
trust and dialogue among NPT members. These two sets of responsibilities, of course, 
will not always be in harmony as the reluctance to sign the Additional Protocol makes 
clear. Yet for Argentina, the challenge will be to strike the right balance between the two 
and, in doing so, to find a way to carve its own niche in the nuclear order. 
The author wants to thank Julián Gadano for his insightful comments and Carolina Zaccato 
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